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In mid-December 2020, subject to great expectations, EU Commissioners Margrethe
Vestager and Thierry Breton presented two large legislative proposals, aimed
at defining a new regulatory regime applicable to internet intermediaries. One
of them is the Digital Services Act (DSA), in form of a Regulation, which will
establish a series of fundamental rules and principles regarding, essentially, the
way intermediaries participate in the publication and distribution of online content. It
focuses especially (but not only) on content hosting and sharing platforms, such as
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube or TikTok.
While the DSA is intended to refit the 20-year-old E-Commerce Directive, it
reproduces a central confusion in its predecessor: The interplay between a lack
of knowledge or awareness of illegality remains a precondition to enjoy liability
exemptions, however, the DSA encourages platforms proactive investigation of
hosted content, which might trigger aforementioned knowledge or awareness. The
inclusion of a Section 230-like ‘good Samaritan clause’, meant to facilitate proactive,
own-initiative investigations by platforms, complicates matters further, and will likely
incentivize the over-removal of hosted content.
Intermediary Liability: From the E-Commerce
Directive to the DSA
The E-Commerce Directive contains, among other relevant aspects, the general
intermediary liability regime applicable to hosting services at the EU level. In order
to retain immunity, platforms must not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or
information and/or not be aware of facts or circumstances from which an illegal
activity or information is apparent. Upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness,
platforms must act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the illegal content
(Article 14 E-Commerce Directive).
The case law of the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) has provided criteria to determine
where such knowledge and/or awareness exists. As established in L’Oréal, rules
set out in Article 14.1.a) of the E-Commerce Directive “must be interpreted as
covering every situation in which the provider concerned becomes aware, in one
way or another, of such facts or circumstances”. The Court also limits liability to
cases where the intermediary “plays an active role of such a kind as to give it
knowledge of, or control” over the hosted content. In other words, intermediaries
enjoy liability immunities inasmuch as they perform a role of a mere technical,
automatic and passive nature. Despite the ECJ’s efforts in a very limited number of
cases, it remains challenging to establish criteria according to which intermediaries’
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interventions can clearly be classified as active or passive. Plenty of interventions or
activities, particularly regarding content moderation, remain in a grey area.
In any case, voluntary proactive measures to monitor, detect and remove illegal
content do not necessarily lead online platforms to lose their liability exemptions.
Certain types of voluntary measures are, in fact, promoted by several EU documents
and policies. Particularly relevant documents are the 2016 ‘Code of conduct on
countering illegal hate speech online’ – launched with and signed by Facebook,
Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube –, the 2017 Commission Communication on tackling
illegal content online, and the Recommendation on measures oriented to the same
purpose. In addition, some recently adopted legislation incorporates new obligations
regarding the adoption of proactive measures – foremost in the 2019 Copyright
Directive.
All this being said, as a general principle, intermediaries can become liable in
the EU, when they are proven to have overlooked a particular illegality when
implementing voluntary measures in such a way as to create actual or constructive
knowledge that strips them of immunity.
Further, making the protection conditional on a blurry definition of “passivity”
incentivizes a hands-off approach that may both result in an increased quantity of
online illegalities, and in the failure to satisfy users who prefer not to be exposed
to objectionable or irrelevant material. The E-Commerce Directive does thus not
incorporate a proper good Samaritan clause, as I show in previous writing. The
principle finds one of its earliest and most-acknowledged embodiments in Section
230(c) of the Communications Decency Act, which is included in the United States
Telecommunications Act of 1996. When platforms are granted full immunity for
the (almost all) content they handle, as under Section 230(c), the law fosters the
adoption and discretionary implementation of private policies regarding illegal and
other types of offensive or harmful content, over the law.
Liability regimes under the DSA
Will the DSA significantly alter this legal landscape? Has the DSA established
a good Samaritan clause that would protect any measure taken in good faith by
platforms to deal with illegal and other forms of objectionable content?
The DSA does not repeal the basic provisions established under the E-Commerce
Directive. In fact, it contains identical provisions regarding hosting service providers
in its Article 5, thus keeping the core of the current conditional intermediary liability
regime untouched. This being said, the DSA incorporates new regulatory “layers”,
which may lead to even more challenging interpretation issues, that will probably
need to be addressed by the Court in Luxembourg as well.
Apart from the provisions included in Article 5, Article 14(3) establishes that notice
and action mechanisms fulfilling certain criteria give rise to actual knowledge
or awareness. In addition, Article 6 clarifies that intermediaries may not lose
their liability protections “solely because they carry out voluntary own initiative
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investigations or other activities aimed at detecting, identifying and removing, or
disabling of access to, illegal content, or take the necessary measures to comply
with the requirements of Union law, including those set out in this Regulation”.
Important clues regarding liability provisions under the DSA are also to be found
in Recital 22, according to which  providers can acquire actual knowledge and
awareness through “own-initiative investigations or notices submitted to it by
individuals or entities in accordance with this Regulation in so far as those notices
are sufficiently precise and adequately substantiated”. This line has intrigued
scholars: does it imply, for example, that investigations originating in unsubstantiated
claims are not sufficient basis for knowledge? Secondly, Recital 25 reinforces and
elaborates that the mere fact that providers undertake investigative activities “does
not lead to the unavailability of the exemptions from liability set out in this Regulation,
provided those activities are carried out in good faith and in a diligent manner”. In
order to be shielded from liability, investigations must aim at “detecting, identifying
and acting against illegal content” or at complying with “the requirements of Union
law, including those set out in this Regulation as regards the implementation of their
terms and conditions”. Recital 25 also acknowledges the “residual” applicability of
the dichotomy between active versus passive/neutral, in particular to cases where
the mentioned exemptions would not concur.
Therefore, without prejudice to the applicability of the general regime – Article
14 E-Commerce Directive, now Article 5 DSA-Draft – the DSA has introduced
additional provisions that appear to encourage, to a certain extent, the adoption
and implementation of proactive content moderation policies by platforms, which
may also significantly affect delineations of liability. Prima facie protection is
granted to certain voluntary initiatives taken by platforms, rendering the general
regime based on the combination of knowledge/awareness and a lack of neutrality/
passivity inapplicable in a relevant number of cases. However, this triggers further
interpretative problems.
Interpretative Problems
Own-initiative investigations remain protected by immunity shields when they “solely”
aim at two main objectives: (i) dealing with illegal content or (ii) complying with other
obligations intermediaries may have according to the DSA itself and other relevant
EU legislation. What are these legal-but-not-necessarily-substantive obligations?
Particular attention should be paid to the obligations for very large platforms (over
45 million users) to “put in place reasonable, proportionate and effective mitigation
measures, tailored to […] specific systemic risks”, per Article 27 DSA-Draft in
connection with Article 26. Systemic risks are conceptualised, among others, as the
dissemination of illegal content, as creating negative effects for the exercise of the
fundamental freedoms of expression and information, and as the creation of negative
or foreseeable effects on the protection of civic discourse, or to electoral processes
and public security via “intentional manipulation of their service, including by means
of inauthentic use or automated exploitation of the service”. These provisions are
extremely open and vague – particularly the regulatory obligations for platforms
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vis-à-vis legal-but-harmful content (Article 26(1)(c)). At the same time, there is a
clear risk of reciprocal contradictions or tensions – especially the protection of free
expression and the mitigation of risks (Article 26(1)(b)). Besides and despite the
reference to reasonableness and proportionality in Article 27, the specific nature and
scope of the specific mitigation measures is left to the discretion of platforms and, in
the last instance, to the decisions from still not clearly identified national regulatory
bodies under the overall oversight of the European Commission.
Further, how should “solely” be interpreted in this context? This adverb seems
to limit immunity protections to cases where platforms have not undertaken any
other activity, beyond the mentioned own investigations, which would indicate
specific knowledge of a concrete piece of content. In other words, the DSA does
not cover other possible actions or measures that may lead the competent authority
to establish the existence of actual knowledge or awareness. Possible examples
include the case of the reception of an order to provide information under Article
9,  or a not properly substantiated notice by a third party when it has led to the
consideration of a specific piece of content.
Effect on Content Moderation Policies
The DSA thus contains a series of interconnected provisions, that do not only affect
platforms’ conditioned liability, but also have a clear impact on the adoption and
enforcement of content moderation policies. These provisions are based on the
following main rules:
1. The DSA maintains the E-Commerce Directive’s general prohibition of the
imposition of general monitoring obligations (Article 7).
2. Platforms may be obliged to establish and implement content moderation
policies in order to deal with illegal and certain types of objectionable content
(developed and overseen by national regulatory bodies in coordination with the
Commission) (Articles 26 and 27).
3. The good Samaritan clause included in Article 6 provides partial liability
protection to platforms engaging in own-initiative investigations, or other
activities aimed at detecting, identifying and removing, or disabling of access
to, illegal content, as well as the necessary measures to comply with the
requirements of Union law, according to what is established in Articles 26 and
27.
4. However, the good Samaritan clause does not cover activities other than own-
initiative investigations. These are situations where the intermediary achieves
actual or specific (and thus not presumed or constructed) knowledge of an
illegality, provided that the intermediary plays an active role of such a kind as to
give it knowledge of, or control over the hosted content, as per the parameters
already established by the ECJ.
In order to provide targeted results, a good Samaritan clause needs to be accurately
crafted and avoid any possible counterincentive. The current wording of the DSA
reproduces difficulties from the E-Commerce Directive. One can still conclude that
the more platforms play an active role in moderating the content they host, the more
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likely they will stumble upon but overlook a particular illegality, therefore incurring
a greater risk of liability. Article 6 could thus lead to more removals, as it would be
safer for the hosting providers engaging in proactive monitoring to remove more, in
avoidance of liability.
In this context, particular problems arise toward measures taken by platforms on
the basis of their own Terms of Service (ToS). ToS go beyond the fulfilment of the
obligations included in the DSA (and other pieces of legislation), regarding the
mitigation of certain risks or, more broadly, the dissemination of legal but harmful
content. In the “flexible” model of structural obligations defined by the DSA – a model
where obligations are defined in an open-ended way – platforms risk penalties for
the incomplete fulfilment of their obligations, and at the same time, they may be held
liable for ToS-based measures going beyond such obligations if they lead, once
again, to the acquisition of knowledge of a piece of illegal content.
Final thoughts
The DSA proposal contains, no doubt, many interesting and innovative provisions.
In many cases, they represent a reinforcement of the rights of users and speakers,
vis-à-vis online intermediaries. However, the confusion regarding the notion of actual
knowledge, awareness and their relationship with a possible “active” role played by
platforms has not been solved and lives on in the sometimes vague language of the
proposal. The importance of counting on a liability regime that provides sufficient
legal certainty to platforms and users suggest that these issues may still be the
object of thorough attention and lengthy debates during the different phases of the
adoption of the Regulation.
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